Discussion
On October 19, 2021, the 258th Japan Specialist Seminar was held as a webinar. In the presence of about 30 participants, Jo Bi-yeon, Ph.D., National Defense Strategy Research Center, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, gave a presentation on 'Japan's Conventional Military Strategy and Korea, a Nuclear Technology State'.
Dr. Jo introduced the trend of valuing South Korea's nuclear potential higher than Japan's in recent studies dealing with the nuclear potential of East Asian countries. In particular, he argued that a re-evaluation of Japan's nuclear potential was necessary because Japan did not stay within the framework of post-war demilitization norms but gradually changed according to changes in the security situation. In this presentation, in the process of evaluating Japan as a country possessing nuclear potential like other countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, Japan was named a ‘nuclear technology state’ that possesses nuclear technology as a potential deterrent.
Before proceeding with the discussion in depth, Dr. Jo first referred to the existing discussion on nuclear potential and the deterrent effect of nuclear potential. As a result, in this presentation, 'nuclear latency' is divided into three categories: (1) nuclear technology such as nuclear facilities, nuclear materials, and warheads, (2) delivery means, and (3) information surveillance and reconnaissance assets (ISR). Japan will re-evaluate its nuclear potential based on these three layers. Dr. Jo stated that she would view the nuclear potential as a “potential/insurance deterrent” of a non-nuclear state in that the availability of nuclear potential can play a decisive role in an emergency.
First, the evaluation of Japan's nuclear potential in terms of nuclear facilities and technology is as follows. First, starting with the operation of the first commercial nuclear reactor in 1966, Japan has recently been procuring 34% of its total electricity through nuclear energy. Since the 1950s, based on the discourse of ‘peaceful use of nuclear power’, it has been pursued only for the livelihood of the people. It is worth noting that in the process, Japan promoted the nuclear fuel cycle including reprocessing technology. In order to process nuclear raw materials into nuclear weapons, two materials are needed: highly enriched uranium and plutonium extracted during nuclear reprocessing. However, only Japan obtained prior consent for nuclear fuel reprocessing in 1988 through negotiations with the United States, becoming the only non-nuclear-weapon country capable of reprocessing. As of 2016, Japan's plutonium reserves reached 48 tons, equivalent to the amount of nuclear warheads equivalent to 6,000 rounds. Meanwhile, after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, there were situations in which all nuclear reactors were shut down, but as of 2015, the reactors started to operate again, and as of March 2021, a total of 5 power plants and a total of 9 nuclear reactors are being restarted. Based on this, it can be evaluated that Japan has the ability to develop a nuclear warhead within six months to one year, and up to five years when it is decided.
When looking at Japan's nuclear potential in terms of delivery means, it is worth paying attention to Japan's rocket technology. Japan started full-scale space development in the 1970s and is completing advanced rocket technology. Recently, many overseas studies are paying attention to Korea's advanced missile, aerospace, and advanced solid fuel technologies, and evaluating Korea as a country that has essentially secured the power to carry nuclear weapons. As we have secured technology, solid fuel technology, semiconductors and machine tools, it is judged that a re-evaluation is necessary. In addition, it is analyzed that it can be seen that Japan's power increase in terms of delivery means has appeared since the recent Abe cabinet. Japan recently converted the Izumo, which was classified as a helicopter-mounted frigate, so that it can be operated as a light carrier, and also budgeted for stand-off long-range cruise missiles. Third, in terms of information surveillance and reconnaissance assets, it is suggested that Japan has multi-layered intelligence surveillance capabilities including satellites, so that information network covering a new area of space or integrated application has been strengthened.
On the other hand, with the current level of nuclear technology, it is not difficult to manufacture a detonator or a high-performance explosive that surrounds plutonium. Second, in terms of delivery means, the space rocket part is limited. Although satellite development technology has been developed since the 1990s, it was launched on a foreign launch vehicle, and there is no propellant made with its own technology yet. However, the potential can be highly evaluated in that it has developed various missiles. Third, in terms of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, it is still more limited than Japan, as it is still highly dependent on the US rather than its own capabilities.
After all, although Japan is a non-nuclear state that relies on the US nuclear umbrella and security promises and is based on its own conventional strategy, it has nuclear potential like other countries such as South Korea and Taiwan. In addition, if we analyze Japan's existing nuclear technology, delivery means, and space/information surveillance and reconnaissance assets, it can be seen that it has secured the ability to be combined as a new potential and insurance deterrent in case of emergency. Comparing Japan and Korea in this context, he added that Japan can be differentiated and analyzed as a country with nuclear technology with nuclear potential centered on nuclear technology, and Korea as a country with nuclear potential centered on means of delivery.
After the presentation, a question-and-answer session followed. There was a question about the existence and role of an exogenous variable called the United States acting on the nuclear potential of Japan and South Korea. The presenter sympathized with the importance of the variable of the United States, but said that from 2010 onwards, the variable of China was added, requiring greater attention. Accordingly, they answered that Japan, which was previously defined as a framework of demilitization norms, is gradually changing under such a threat environment, and that such changes have also occurred in the area of nuclear potential.
In addition, the action of domestic political factors such as anti-nuclear and nuclear-free civic groups on Japan's nuclear disarmament, the level of North Korea's nuclear technology, the nuclear threat from China and the Soviet Union as a background for securing Japan's nuclear fuel cycle, and the aspect that nuclear power generation causes less environmental pollution The seminar was concluded after discussions were made on questions such as the phenomenon of interest in Japan, the relationship between Japan's nuclear armament and inter-Korean relations, factors limiting Japan's nuclear armament, and Taiwan's nuclear potential.
