

The Hidden Historical Circumstances surrounding the Jiandao Expedition as Seen through the *Yomiuri Newspaper*

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Abstract | This article reviews perceptions within Japanese society of the Japanese Army's Jiandao Expedition (Kantō *Shuppei* in Japanese, Kando *Ch'imgong* in Korean), which began in October 1920 and ended in May 1921, as reflected by reporting and commentary within the *Yomiuri Newspaper* (*Yomiuri shinbun*). What new perspectives does this study offer compared with previous research that utilized the reports and documents of the Japanese Army and Foreign Ministry?

First, the image of the Jiandao Expedition painted by Ministry of the Army documents and reports is one of a joint operation by Japan and China based on a smoothly concluded agreement. However, the *Yomiuri Newspaper* shows that the government in Beijing strongly opposed the Japanese plan, and the Japanese government in the end was only able to receive a “temporary understanding” from China. In other words, this was a “joint invasion” only in name and was in fact a “unilateral invasion.”

Second, on November 2, two weeks after receiving understanding for its “deployment of troops,” the Japanese government had to consent to Chinese demands for “withdrawal.” However, the position of the Army, which already had troops in China, and the Foreign Ministry, which was concerned about public order in Jiandao, was to “delay the withdrawal” as long as possible or request the Chinese government give prior approval to a redeployment to use as leverage in negotiations. The Chinese government strongly responded to this position by the Japanese, stating the Japanese were “overstepping their authority” and “violating China’s sovereignty.” These strong complaints by China about Japan “stepping over the line” and details about the lengthy negotiations are shown for the first time through this review of the *Yomiuri Newspaper*.

Third, Japan did not respond to China’s *démarches* by quickly withdrawing all its troops, and instead plotted to either delay the withdrawal or substitute troops with police officers in Jiandao. In the midst of this scheming, the “Jiandao deployment” began receiving international attention and anti-Japan sentiment began to increase. Not only did Japan receive “demands from the great powers of Great Britain, France, and the US for an explanation of the deployment of troops to Jiandao,” but in Great Britain in particular the “Jiandao issue” became a subject of discussion in Parliament. Colonel Mizumachi’s “gaffe” about foreign missionaries controlling the independence movement

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and ideology of Koreans in the region caused an uproar so significant that it was addressed in newspaper editorials. However, Japanese criticism of Mizumachi's statement only superficially focused on the words or criticized the military for overstepping its authority, and the Japanese media avoided stating the facts about the inhumane massacre of civilians in Jiandao. Instead, the newspapers characterized the killings in the Zhangyandong region as fabrications, defamation, and false reports. This displayed the limits of the perspective offered by the *Yomiuri Newspaper*.

Keywords | Jiandao Expedition (Kantō *Shuppei*, Kando *Ch'imgong*), *Yomiuri Newspaper* (*Yomiuri shinbun*), mass media, anti-Japan sentiment, *History of the Jiandao Expedition*, violation of sovereignty

Introduction

The Jiandao Expedition (Kantō *Shuppei*, Kando *Ch'imgong*)¹ refers to destruction of Korean villages and the massacre of thousands of Koreans throughout the Jiandao region, which is located just north of the Tumen and Yalu rivers in modern-day China. The invasion began with the approval of the Japanese government based on the pretext of “protecting Japanese citizens living in Jiandao” on October 7, 1920 and continued until the withdrawal of all Japanese military forces in May 1921 after having annihilated the bases of Korean independence fighters in the region. The Korean forces' battle against this Japanese invasion is known as the “Battle of Chǒngsan-ri” and the massacre of civilians is known as the “Jiandao Massacre” (or “Kyǒngshin Massacre”).

There is a wealth of previous studies on the Jiandao Expedition which approach the subject from diverse perspectives. First, research has sought to investigate the facts about the independence fighters' struggle by analyzing their tactics and organization during the Battle of Chǒngsan-ri.² Second and similarly, other scholars have researched the tactics and operations of the Japanese military.³ Third, research has inquired into the extent of the “Jiandao Massacre” and the

1. Jiandao (Kantō in Japanese, Kando in Korean) corresponds to the southeastern parts of present-day Jilin Province, China, and to the area around the Tumen (Tuman) River and Yalu (Amnok) River basins. The phrase “Kantō *Shuppei*” reflects the Japanese perspective of the invasion by calling it a “dispatch of soldiers” rather than an invasion (*ch'imgong* in Korean) and should thus be viewed with caution. This article uses the term “Jiandao Expedition” as it is the most widely recognized translation with connotations of both dispatch and martial intentions.

2. Representative research in this field includes (in order of publication) Cho Tong-göl et al. (1973); Sin Yong-ha (1985); Yun Pyǒng-sǒk (1990), Kim T'aek (1992); Sin Chae-hong (1999); Cho Tong-göl (2000); Pak Ch'ang-uk (2000); Chang Se-yun (2005, 2007); Cho P'il-gun (2011); Cho Wǒn-gi (2012); Sin Hyo-sung (2016); Pak Hwan (2020); Chang Se-yun (2021a); Yang Su-yǒn (2022).

3. Matsuda (2020); Tobe (2005); Kim Yeonok (2019, 2020b); Sin Chu-baek (2021) and more.

destruction of Korean villages.⁴ A fourth thread of research has analyzed the foreign policy of the Hara Cabinet (Yi Söng-hwan 2000), while a fifth category of research has reinvestigated the Hunchun incident (Chang Söng-gyu 2021). Finally, separate research has studied the mobilization of Korean police forces as part of the Jiandao Expedition.⁵

However, there is no analysis of how the Jiandao Expedition was perceived within Japan. Through histories of the Jiandao Expedition we can understand the responses and perceptions of the Army and Foreign Ministry, but there is no analysis of general public opinion outside of related government organs. One recent study analyzes how the remarks of a Japanese colonel (*taisa*) invoked diplomatic criticism and how his remarks were reported by foreign newspapers (Kim Yeonok 2020a, 128-39), and other research has studied reports in the Chinese media (Kim Chu-yong 2012). There is also a trend of studying Japanese media reports about the Korean independence movement in relation to the March 1st Movement.⁶

Based on this previous research, this article seeks to describe the tone and the perspective offered by Japanese media reports on the Jiandao Expedition (which was described in the reports as the “Jiandao dispatch (*shuppei*)”). This will be accomplished by focusing on articles in the *Yomiuri Newspaper* (*Yomiuri shinbun*). Here it is important to ask why use the *Yomiuri Newspaper*. The answer to this question lies in distinct characteristics and merits of this newspaper.

Today, the *Yomiuri Newspaper* is one of the six major national newspapers in Japan, and it was founded in November 1874. Differently from major newspapers (*öshinbun*) who focused on readers from the “middle or upper classes,” the *Yomiuri Newspaper* was a small newspaper (*koshinbun*) which targeted readers from the “lower classes” by being written in a style which was easy to read and sold at a cheap price (Sasaki 2013, 14, 44, 76, 115). After the Russo-Japanese War, a period known as the “extra news wars” (*gögai gassen*) unfolded in which Japanese newspapers competed with one another to quickly release new information to readers. During this period, the *Yomiuri Newspaper* began a “breaking news service” using telegram technology and resultantly became popular for its quick provision of news (222). In other words, the *Yomiuri Newspaper* was a media service which “quickly” provided “easy to understand” information compared with other newspapers. The “speed” of reports from the *Yomiuri Newspaper* are

4. Cho Tong-göl (1998); Kim Ch'un-sön (2000); Chöng Ye-ji (2011); Kim Chu-yong (2012); Kim Yeonok (2020a, 2021); Chang Se-yun (2021b); Kim Chu-yong (2021a, 2022) and more.

5. Kim Chu-yong (2021b) and more.

6. Pak Ũn-yöng (2019); Yi Se-yön (2019); Kim To-hyöng (2019) and more.

advantageous in that it allows us to check simultaneously the reports on the progress of the battles during the Jiandao Expedition, the negotiations between China and Japan, and international public opinion.

Another advantage of the *Yomiuri Newspaper* is that it is possible to check a variety of hidden situations that cannot be confirmed by referring to the official documents of the Japanese military and Foreign Ministry. For example, there is no mention of the Jiandao Expedition in the official documents of the Foreign Ministry entitled “Japanese Diplomatic Documents 1920” (*Nihon gaikō bunsho Taishō 9-nen*). However, it should be noted that this same document has a comparatively detailed record of the Siberia Expedition. Moreover, we should be wary of the “selective” use of telegrams or parts of telegrams in the Japanese Army’s report on the invasion of Jiandao entitled *History of the Jiandao Expedition* (*Kantō shuppeishi*).⁷ In other words, if we rely solely on the official documents of the Japanese Army and Foreign Ministry as the only sources for investigating the invasion of Jiandao, we cannot but be limited in understanding views of other actors outside the Japanese government. The *Yomiuri Newspaper* is a tool for filling in the gaps or biases which might result from such an overreliance on official documents. This newspaper has a variety of sections such as “military,” “Asia,” and “the West” which contain articles on a variety of international disputes in each region including the Siberia Expedition and the Jiandao Expedition. Although reports on military matters often use documents from the Army, the views of the Foreign Ministry and Army are addressed equally and, importantly, perspectives that were difficult to discuss within the military were recorded in the newspaper.

Of course, we can also see that reports in the *Yomiuri Newspaper*, as a newspaper produced from the perspective of Japanese editors, tended to “cover up massacres” that were being heavily criticized in the international community. However, viewing the Jiandao Expedition through the *Yomiuri Newspaper* is advantageous in that it includes reports quickly sent from the field which included various views difficult to confirm through official government documents, and critically picked out hidden aspects of the conflict in a variety of articles. While it would be ideal to compare reports about the Jiandao Expedition from a variety of newspapers, there are no articles in the *Asahi Newspaper* (*Asahi shinbun*) or *Mainichi Newspaper* (*Mainichi shinbun*) in 1920 which mention “Jiandao.” Thus this article focuses exclusively on the *Yomiuri Newspaper*.

This article reviews articles in the *Yomiuri Newspaper* from October 1920 when the Jiandao Expedition began to May 1921 when the withdrawal of troops

7. Chosŏn’gun Saryŏngbu (2019) is the Korean translation of the report.

was completed. During this period of time there were a total of 132 relevant articles. These articles were classified into three categories for analysis: first, perceptions of the joint deployment; second, negotiations of the withdrawal and follow-up measures; and third, the spread of anti-Japan sentiment.

Through this I will investigate the various perceptions of the invasion within Japanese society from the “dispatch” of soldiers to their “withdrawal,” and in particular seek to understand the Japanese efforts to conceal what happened in Jiandao as anti-Japan opinions spread across the world following the invasion. It is my hope that this research will highlight the implications of the Jiandao Expedition which is often overlooked in Japan’s broader range of continental expansion policy.

Perceptions of the “Joint Deployment”

After receiving permission from the Cabinet (Hara 1965, 291-92),⁸ the Japanese Army began specific military actions and concealment operations on the evening of October 7, 1920 (Chosŏngun Saryŏngbu 2019, 33).⁹ On October 14, the commanding officer of the 19th Division Ōba announced that the dispatch of troops was inevitable in order to “protect Japanese citizens” (Gunmukyoku, Rikugunshō 1920b, 522-23). However, we can see Japan’s confused response after hearing of China’s “disapproval” on October 15 and 16 in the following document.

Document 1

① Per the government’s statement on the situation in Jiandao, this was naturally a necessary and inevitable action taken in self-defense of the Empire. China initially told Consul (*kōshi*) Obata that it agreed the [Japanese] Empire’s actions were necessary, *but nevertheless has recently reversed its previous position in this statement*. We therefore assume that in between the two statements some issue has lingered in their minds. After consultations between Banzai and Major General (*shōshō*) Higashi, *we will promptly report about what issue arose in the intermittent period*. (Gunmukyoku, Rikugunshō 1920b, 526)

8. October 7, 1920. Although there was a regularly scheduled meeting of the Cabinet on the following day, a special meeting of the Cabinet was convened on this day following a request by the Foreign Minister for an urgent discussion on the Hunchun problem. Based on a proposal by Foreign Minister Uchida, it was decided that forces would be divided into three units and dispatched to Jiandao (roughly 3,000 troops), and as a demonstration troops would be sent from Khabarovsk to Korea via land.

9. Chapter 2 “Chakchŏn haengdong” (“Operations”), Section 1 “Chòt’ojunbi” (“Preparation for scorched earth tactics”)

② On the one hand, our government explained to the Chinese government the inevitable circumstances for the dispatch of an increased number of troops, and the Chinese government on October 9 told Consul Obata that it understood the situation. However, suddenly on October 12 this *position has been reversed*, and the Chinese government is refusing to sanction our deployment of troops. . . . As such, this is the first time the Japanese people have heard that the Chinese government is refusing to approve our two dispatches of forces, and we cannot help but be surprised by this unexpected statement. (“Kantō shuppei no seimei” 1920, emphasis added by the author)

The first document is a telegram sent to Major General Banzai from the Minister of the Army.¹⁰ The second document is an editorial published on October 16 in the *Yomiuri Newspaper*. The article in the *Yomiuri Newspaper* describes, using the phrase “Japanese citizens,” the great deal of confusion that resulted from China’s refusal to approve of the dispatch of troops, signifying the degree to which the Japanese Army internally took for granted the “joint deployment” of troops with China.

Both of the above documents use the phrase “reverse their previous position” and describe the Chinese position has having suddenly changed from “understanding” to “disapproval.” What was the “issue that arose in the intermittent time” that was noted in the telegram from the Minister of the Army to Major General Banzai? The hidden issue behind China’s “change in perception” cannot be found in the records of the Japanese Army, but there is a report published by the *Yomiuri Newspaper* worth considering.

Document 2

Consul Obata should be instructed to ① *divide the essential points of the negotiations between China and Japan on the Jiandao problem into two steps: first, the Chinese approval of our emergency dispatch of troops, and second, an agreement on the joint deployment of Chinese and Japanese troops.* . . . The expected announcement of a certain joint deployment of Chinese and Japanese troops has in a single day suddenly become an announcement of a unilateral deployment of Japanese troops. ② *The reason behind this was an undetectable disturbance between the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Japanese Army, or between Zhang Zuolin and the government in Beijing. For Beijing to have changed its position so suddenly, it is possible that there was a difference in opinion about a joint deployment negotiated between our Army and Zhang Zuolin, or that Zhang Zuolin ignored the central government and acted alone, or that our Army put too much weight on Zhang Zuolin.* In any case, if our Foreign Ministry did not seek permission from China for the emergency dispatch of troops from the beginning, it is a big

10. Banzai Rihachirō (1871-1950) was a Japanese Army officer who reached the rank of Lieutenant General.

problem that they have now sought permission but have been rejected. Moreover, until the day before the October 14 statement, ③ *we were led to believe that not only had the government received permission for the troop deployment in step one but also concluded an agreement on the step two joint deployment of troops with Beijing. It is difficult to understand the circumstances that could have led to the completely opposite result no matter how you explain it.* (“Kyōdō shuppei ippenshite” 1920, emphasis added by the author)

There are three points that deserve attention in the above cited document. First, as mentioned in the portion labeled ③, the belief that China had completely approved of a “joint deployment of troops” was one widely held by the Japanese public. Second, the portion labeled ② provides four possible reasons behind the Chinese government’s “sudden change”: a difference of views between the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Japanese Army, a disagreement between Zhang Zuolin and the Chinese government, the possibility that the decision for a joint deployment was made between Zhang Zuolin (rather than the Chinese government) and the Japanese Army, or an overreliance on Zhang Zuolin by the Japanese military. Third, as mentioned in the portion labeled ①, the author argues that the strange Jiandao Expedition situation should be resolved by dividing the issue into two stages. In the first stage, the Japanese government should seek a temporary “understanding” from the Chinese government for the “emergency deployment” of Japanese troops who were already stationed near the border. And then the Japanese government should clearly recognize and respond to the Chinese “refusal” regarding the deployment of six extra battalions from Japan in stage two.

In all three documents cited above, the Japanese “dispatch of troops” is predicated on securing the approval of the Chinese government, and there is a broad perception that a positive response or even full agreement from the Chinese had been provided regarding the joint deployment of troops to the region.

Then what was the actual mood or position of the Chinese government? Did the Chinese government really suddenly change their position as described in the above Japanese documents? Or if this was just a hasty judgement by the Japanese, what was the real intentions of the Chinese government? To answer these questions, let us review the documents on the negotiations and agreement after the October invasion had begun.

First, internal documents of the Japanese Army stated the following after the official approval was given by the Cabinet:

On the same day [October 7] at 1:00 am, the Minister of the Army sent a notice of the Cabinet’s decision that, given the circumstances in the Jiandao region,

troops would be deployed to safeguard the Japanese colonies in Jiandao and their interests. The Chinese government should be immediately notified and we should seek their approval for a joint deployment of soldiers. *If the Chinese government does not approve, the Japanese side will independently suppress the Koreans in the region as a matter of unavoidable self-defense* and the timing for this deployment of troops will be carried out without haste (Chosŏn'gun Saryŏngbu 2019, 33, emphasis added by the author).

In other words, the Japanese Army was determined to carry out an “independent Japanese suppression” operation even if the Chinese government did not approve.

Japan continued to hope for an agreement with China on a “joint suppression operation” up until October 17 at which point they declared that the “China-Japan joint operation has been suggested, but given the lack of a response from China the Japanese government has declared it will implement the plan as a means of self-defense regardless of China’s decision.” Finally on October 16, the acting Japanese Consul in Jiandao Sakai informed the sub-provincial administrator of Yanji (Yanji *daoyin*) that “operations would begin on October 17 at midnight” and that cooperation was sought.

However, just as the orders for operations to begin were delivered on October 16, a dramatic offer to begin negotiating a “joint China-Japan suppression operation” was received (Chosŏn'gun Saryŏngbu 2019, 45-46). Yet it is unclear when exactly the “Agreement on the Joint China-Japan Suppression Operation” was concluded. Referring to just the *History of the Jiandao Expedition*, one would assume the agreement was concluded on the same day it was “suggested,” but other sources make it seem likely the agreement was concluded between October 17 and October 28.

The main content of the “Agreement on the Joint China-Japan Suppression Operation” was the separation of the region into areas overseen by China and those overseen by Japan. Article 2 states that “Suppression of mounted and unmounted bandits in the five prefectures of Dongning (except for the area twenty Chinese *ri* [10.8 km] south of the Chinese Eastern Railway), Hunchun, Yanji, Wangqing, Helong will be conducted by the Japanese Army. However, the first and second squadrons of the Chinese Army and the Chinese constabulary will remain in the provinces and prefectures to which they are assigned and be tasked with maintaining order.” Article 3 states that “the Chinese Army will be responsible for repressing the bands of marauders outside of the five areas noted above” (Chōsengun Sanbōchō 1920).¹¹ That is, while on the surface this was a

11. From Ōno Toyoshi, Chief of Staff, Korea Army (Chōsengun Sanbōchō) to Yamanashi Hanzō, Assistant Secretary of the Army.

“joint suppression operation,” the Japanese Army was tasked with repression in the five most crucial regions and thus in reality it was actually an “independent Japanese suppression operation.” An article in the *Yomiuri Newspaper* concurred with this assessment stating “in the end, the operation is a joint one in name, but in actuality there is no way to carry out the suppression operation without it being centered on the deployed Japanese units” (“Kantō shutsudōgun katsuyaku” 1920, emphasis added by the author).

Discussions about Withdrawal and Negotiations on Follow-up Measures

Although perhaps only “joint” in name, it was Japan which drove the agreement on the “joint suppression operation.” Then, only about two weeks after the announcement of the “beginning of suppression operations” was made on October 17, discussions about withdrawal commenced unexpectedly (Gunmukyoku, Rikugunshō 1920a, 1258). These discussions were unlikely to have been driven by early successes of the repression because the Japanese military had planned for the operation to “wipe away the Koreans” to take at least one month (Chosŏn’gun Saryōngbu 2019, 47-48). Given that articles in the *Yomiuri Newspaper* noted that the “suppression operations” were not going as planned due to the geographical characteristics of the region and the fact that the targets of repression were secluding themselves in heavily wooded areas,¹² there was no reason for the Japanese government to suggest withdrawal first. In other words, the calls for the withdrawal of the Japanese Army from Jiandao were coming from China, in particular the government in Beijing.

In the official Army records included in the *History of the Jiandao Expedition*, there is hardly any mention of the tensions between China and Japan over the withdrawal of Japanese troops. However, articles in the *Yomiuri Newspaper*

12. “According to statements from Army officials, we cannot be hasty about the progress of our Army’s suppression operations. The movement of troops is extremely difficult in the southern part of the Russian Maritime Province, the Hunchun region, and in the direction of Jiandao along the left bank of the Tumen River where the violence is the heaviest. Moreover, because of the large size of the region, the bandits are unable to engage actively in hostile action. They are scattered in all directions and lurking under the guise of common people, making it impossible to subjugate them no matter how many troops are deployed. Therefore, during the first half of the year concentrated efforts to suppress the bandits will be halted due to the winter weather. It is unclear whether we will be able to withdraw all our troops during that period, and a decision cannot be made until we find a way to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants” (“Kantō shutsudōgun katsuyaku” 1920).

paint a distinct picture of Chinese demands for a quick withdrawal and the Japanese position which sought to delay the withdrawal as much as possible. Document 3 describes the Chinese position of demanding Japanese withdrawal.

Document 3

The Hunchun incident seems to be an increasingly serious problem. The contents of Consul Obata's message to Minister Yan on October 9 and Minister Yan's reply show they have different opinions. According to China's report, Consul Obata told Minister Yan that once order was restored in Hunchun the Japanese Army would immediately withdraw. But according to the Japanese report, ① *Minister Yan heard from Consul Obata about the Japanese dispatch of soldiers after two Japanese squadrons had already reached Hunchun and before a request for approval had been made and Minister Yan expressed his opposition to the Japanese decision to deploy another six battalions.*

The [Chinese] Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 11 registered a complaint with the Japanese legation and expressed its opposition to additional dispatches of Japanese troops to Hunchun. The Japanese Foreign Ministry stated that the Chinese complaint signified a change in Chinese government policy, while the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied this and argued the purpose of the notification was to reaffirm what Minister Yan had said to Consul Obata. . . .

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly stated it had never expressed its approval for the deployment of Japanese troops. . . and that the clearing of Korean bandits was not something that could be accomplished in a single day. This will nearly eliminate any deadline for the withdrawal of troops . . . and that the clearing of Korean bandits was not something that could be accomplished in a single day. This will nearly eliminate any deadline for the withdrawal of troops.

The notification given by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs also added a description of the bandits. ② *China stated that it had sufficient manpower to overpower these lawbreakers and that there is no need to be concerned about disorder in this region. Also, Japan was exceeding its authority by stationing troops on Chinese territory and dealing with Chinese citizens. The stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory is completely unjustifiable and they should be removed immediately.* ("Konshun mondai mizukakeron" 1920, emphasis added by the author)

The last paragraph in the above article labeled ② deserves special attention. China expressed its intention to mobilize forces to offer protection from bandits disturbing law and order in the border region, and strongly criticized the Japanese Army's continued stationing (or delayed withdrawal) of its troops from Chinese territory despite China's declared intention to act.

In Document 2, we can see that there was an agreement on a "joint suppression operation" in the unimportant outlying areas, but Document 3 shows a very strongly worded demand from China for Japan's withdrawal. The justification for this is explained in the portion of Document 3 labeled ①. Here we can see

that Foreign Minister Yan was making a distinction between the deployment of two Japanese squadrons to Hunchun and the deployment of six Japanese battalions from Japan proper. The deployment of two Japanese squadrons to Hunchun, as can be seen from another article, referred to the deployment of troops from the 19th Japanese Division already stationed on the Korean Peninsula in Nanam (“Kainei ni waga gun shūchū” 1920). Meanwhile, the reinforcements consisting of six battalions refers to an additional deployment of troops from the Japanese home islands which was approved by the Japanese government on October 7. In the latter case, this signified a mobilization of more than 6,000 troops (“Kantō teppei chakushu” 1920), and no matter how short-term or temporary this deployment would be, it was not something to which the Chinese government could readily agree. Moreover, if we closely analyze the contents labeled ①, prior notification of the deployment of the two squadrons from Korea was given to Minister Yan, but if we read between the lines there seems to be a sense of “discomfort” as if prior notification of the reinforcement decision was not given to China. Whether or not it was decided beforehand or afterwards, it is clear that the Chinese government was firmly opposed to the Japanese position that it would send reinforcements without Chinese approval and leave them stationed in Chinese territory. And thereafter the Chinese registered protests with Japan about its increase in the number of troops in Jiandao (“Teppei ishi tsūkoku” 1920).

Next we will analyze the position and counter-arguments of the Japanese side on withdrawal through Document 4. On November 9, Consul Obata met with Minister Yan and suggested the following on the withdrawal issue.

Document 4

- (1) The Chinese government should take complete responsibility for peace and order in the Jiandao region.
- (2) The Chinese government should station many troops in the areas in which Japanese citizens reside and firmly protect their lives and property.
- (3) *In the event that order in the Jiandao region should deteriorate after the Japanese Army withdraws, consent will be given beforehand for a redeployment of Japanese troops.*
- (4) If the three above conditions can be guaranteed, Japanese troops will be gradually withdrawn. (“Kantō teppei kōshō” 1920, emphasis in original)

The key demands are found in conditions 2 and 3 above. Only when China’s actions on ensuring the security of Japanese residents in Jiandao is deemed certain will the Japanese Army be withdrawn; or in other words, if the security of Japanese residents remains in doubt, then the withdrawal of Japanese troops will be delayed. Furthermore, another condition requires that China provide

consent beforehand for the redeployment of Japanese troops should a similar situation arise, which amounts to prior approval for any future redeployment.

The Chinese government expressed its opposition to these Japanese demands on several occasions.¹³ The basics of the Chinese reply can be summed up by the following:

- (1) The duty for safeguarding Japanese citizens' lives and property and the Japanese Consulate in the Jiandao region will be overseen by Zhang Zuolin, and to achieve this objective we are negotiating with General Zhang about the number of Chinese troops to be deployed and where they will be stationed. Once a decision is made we will provide notification.
- (2) The position of the Chinese government is that considering the aforementioned measures there will not be any further deterioration in the public order of the region, and therefore there will be no need for the redeployment of troops from Japan. Any unscheduled deployment of Japanese troops will be difficult to approve. ("Konshun kōshō zento" 1920)

China not only refused to approve any "unscheduled deployment" of Japanese troops, but also strongly and repeatedly demanded Japan withdraw its troops.¹⁴ Given this response, the Japanese government began shifting the focus of its arguments. First, Japan began suggesting the need for compensating Japanese citizens in Jiandao who suffered loss due to the inability to maintain public order, and, second, Japan suggested some Japanese troops remain and that police officers are deployed.

Demands for compensation for the Hunchun incident were as follows: according to the document submitted to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 14, Japan required (1) condolence money for those who perished and compensation for those who were injured, (2) compensation for property damage, (3) the punishment of related Chinese officers and soldiers and disciplinary action against related government officials, and (4) an apology from the Chinese government ("Nihon no yōkyū jōkō" 1921). China, on the one hand, responded by stating that it would survey the status of burned Chinese homes in the Jiandao region and prepare to demand compensation from Japan, and moreover strongly stated that "while we recognize [Japan's] compensation demands for the Hunchun incident, negotiations on compensation cannot begin

13. There are several articles in the *Yomiuri Newspaper* which outline Chinese refusal to approve the "redeployment" of Japanese troops. For example, "Akumade shuppei horyū" (1920); "Shuppei kyojetsu" (1920); "Konshun kōshō zento" (1920).

14. There are several articles in the *Yomiuri Newspaper* which describe the rush to withdraw troops such as "Konshun teppei o yōkyū" (1920); "Teppei yōkyū" (1920); "Dai-san kai teppei yōkyū" (1921).

until after all Japanese troops have left Manchuria. Otherwise accepting these demands will be difficult” (“Nihon ni baishō yōkyū” 1921).

Next let us review the arguments made in regard to leaving some Japanese troops in Jiandao after the withdrawal and the substitution of the Japanese Army with police officers.

Document 5

① . . . *The inclination of Foreign Ministry officials in Jiandao and the Government-General of Korea is for a force of armed police officers (total 2,000 officers) to be substituted into the region after our troops are withdrawn, but it is the position of the Foreign Ministry that, due to budget and personnel restrictions, it is difficult to approve of this measure. Moreover, it will be extremely difficult to secure Chinese approval.* For the Chinese government, which is already aware of suggestions to deploy an armed unit of police members, this will appear the same as having Japanese troops stationed in the region regardless of the Army’s withdrawal and will lead them to voice claims of violations of Chinese sovereignty. If such attacks continue, it will be difficult to avoid delaying the complete withdrawal of our forces. (“Konshun jiken no kōshō” 1921, emphasis added by the author)

② It has been decided by all concerned sides that *for the time being countermeasures for the Jiandao Hunchun incident are for the deployed Army forces to be removed while at the same time increasing the number of police officers. There will be a total of 140 police officers added, and these are police officers who will be transferred from the Government-General of Korea to the Foreign Ministry.* As a result, seventeen of the currently deployed constables of the Government-General have remained and the remainder have returned to Korea. *The additional 140 police officers will join the Foreign Ministry’s 238 security officers already in residence in the area and be charged with protecting Japanese residents in Jiandao. However, due to the security situation, many of the 238 security officer positions are vacant, and the total forces are only at half capacity, so even if 140 police officers are added they are only filling the existing void and bringing the forces to their original level.* Therefore, it is doubtful that public safety can be maintained for the 30,000 residents in Jiandao which is the size of Kyushu. The situation is very dangerous and we will be fortunate to avoid another Hunchun incident. (“Kantō zōha keikan” 1921, emphasis added by the author)

In the first cited document above, we can see that the Foreign Ministry and the Government-General of Korea were collecting opinions on replacing the Army troops deployed to the region with armed police officers. The Japanese government was conscious of the Chinese position that this would “violate its sovereignty,” but in the end, as is seen in the second citation, it was decided to increase the number of police officers in the region. However, while in ① it is suggested that 2,000 police officers be added, we can see that only 140 were sent.

What was the response of China to Japan's scheme and their unhesitating willingness to "violate China's sovereignty?" A January 17 report states the following:

The [Chinese] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *demanding a full withdrawal of Japanese troops*, stated there are already enough Chinese troops stationed in the Jiandao region to safeguard the lives and property of Japanese citizens and maintain public safety. Additionally, according to a report of the Jilin Army, *many Japanese police officers have crossed the border and are in the Jiandao region*. If this is true, the Chinese government stated it was worried that this will again agitate the minds of the people and *requested the complete withdrawal of these forces*. ("Dai-san kai tepei yōkyū" 1921, emphasis added by the author)

That is, China was aware of Japan's plot to replace withdrawing troops with police officers and from January was requesting the withdrawal of all forces including police officers. On January 28 as well, the Chinese government released a statement saying, "Despite the previous Chinese complaint, Japan continues to maintain a police station in Jiandao and is increasing the number of armed police officers. We have submitted another complaint and again request the immediate withdrawal of Japanese forces" ("Chūgoku no Kantō kōgi" 1921). On February 19, another report covered the Chinese complaint and request for the quick withdrawal of armed police officers ("Chūgoku seifu yori tokusoku" 1921).

Spread of Anti-Japan Sentiment

As Japan refused to quickly withdraw or provide a promise to withdraw all of its forces despite China's protests, and amid its schemes to delay withdrawal and replace troops with police officers, the world's attention turned to the Jiandao Expedition, inciting opposition from various groups and worsening anti-Japan sentiment.

First, college students in China began holding anti-Japan protests. With Japan refusing to withdrawal and instead demanding the right to "freely" deploy its troops or "repeatedly" deploy its troops when necessary, student protests began to oppose Japan. Reports on these protests stated the following: "The Beijing Student Union, made up of students from secondary schools in Beijing, began holding protests opposing Japan's Jiandao Expedition. Today beginning at 2:00 pm, about 3,000 students (about 1,000 of whom were female students) gathered in Tiananmen Square and then divided into two protest lines. One line

marched to the Presidential Office Building and demanded a meeting with the President, while the other line waved flags and passed out manifestoes as they walked the streets. The manifesto included strong anti-Japan statements, but the protest line moved in a very virtuous manner. Later on, the protest line against the Jiandao Expedition of the Beijing Student Union which was comprised of about 5,000 students (one-third of whom were female) marched to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and tried to push their way inside, but were blocked at the door to the building. They tried to push their way inside and eventually about 500 were allowed inside. Foreign Minister Yan volunteered to meet the students and talk with them, and noted that he took responsibility and would see to it that the Hunchun problem was thoroughly resolved. The students were satisfied with his remarks and finally left at around 7:00 pm” (“Shuppei ryūho ni hantai” 1920).

Second, Western powers began to grow concerned with Japan’s actions. Let us review reports on this phenomenon chronologically, starting with this report published during the early phase of the invasion on October 22.

Document 6

Everybody knows there is another aspiration behind the Japanese Army’s deployment over the Hunchun incident other than protecting the people residing in the region, maintaining public order, and preventing a similar situation from arising in the future. *Some politicians in China have misinterpreted the Jiandao deployment as deriving from territorial ambitions. In fact, as in the case of an American agency in Beijing [sic], the Sino-American News Agency (Chung Mei [sic] News Agency),¹⁵ the Japanese Army is using the Hunchun incident as a pretext to secure rights on land surrounding the Chinese Eastern Railway, and has issued a false report that Japan has negotiated with the superintendent’s office (dubanshu) of the Chinese Eastern Railway about ways to have the Chinese military withdraw from these areas. This is being used to heighten the anti-Japan sentiments of the Chinese people.* Moreover, the Japanese Army has no other intention other than wiping out the bandits and Korean rebels to maintain peace and order in the region, and has not initiated any negotiations. Therefore, there are no grounds for claims of any rejection from Superintendent (duban) Song Xiaolian. Although it is an assumption, this appears to be nothing more than an attempt at anti-Japan propaganda. *In particular, as this report originates from the anti-Japan entity of the Sino-American News Agency, it is clear that this report has no grounds whatsoever.* (Statement of an anonymous Army official; “Shuppei tai nashi” 1920, bolded emphasis in original, italicized emphasis added by the author)

15. The Sino-American News Agency (Zhong Mei Tongxunshe) was established in Shanghai by an independent US government agency called the Committee on Public Information as a CPI conduit to the Chinese press.

If we review more closely the emphasized portions, even if we consider the anti-Japan bias of the Sino-American News Agency, it is important to pay attention to the point that some viewed the Japanese Army entering Jiandao as a ploy to acquire rights to land surrounding the Chinese Eastern Railway. A later report stated that “In particular, recently Great Britain, France, and the US have been seeking clarification of Japan’s deployment of troops to Jiandao” (“Kantō shuppei ni taisuru” 1920).

These doubts did not stop at alarmism and actually developed into complaints. In particular, the “Jiandao issue” became a subject of discussion in the British House of Commons. This situation was described in articles published on December 24, 1920 and March 3, 1921.

Document 7

(A) Today in the British House of Commons, Undersecretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs Harmsworth answered a question from MP Newman stating,

“The Government has already instructed the British Ambassador to Japan Elliot to ① *on several occasions inquire about the Japanese Army’s cruel behavior on the [Chinese] border with Korea.* ② *The number of Japanese troops in Manchuria is less than 15,000. Therefore, this cannot be an attempt by Japan to exert sovereign power over Manchuria.* And ③ *British policy in China is to preserve Chinese sovereignty in all instances.*”

MP Billing asked “*If Great Britain were to interfere in this incident, would it not be like a lot of small wars which require a relatively large amount of cost?*” Undersecretary Harmsworth replied, “*I do not believe so. This case is covered in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance.*” (“Eikoku gikai de” 1920, emphasis added by the author)

(B) In the British House of Commons, Undersecretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs Harmsworth answered a question by stating,

“④ *I have heard about reports of the Japanese Army carrying out military operations on territory that is not Japanese and in doing so murdering Korean people and destroying Korean property in Jiandao, but I have no positive information about the Japanese Army being particularly discriminatory towards Christians in Korea. However, the British government will naturally call attention to the aforementioned report when speaking with the Japanese government.*” (“Kantō mondai” 1921, emphasis added by the author)

Through the above documents we can see that the Jiandao issue was a relatively important issue at the time in the British House of Commons. We should note that the British closely observed the inhumane actions of the Japanese including the brutal massacre of Koreans, and that they sought to

confirm the facts with the Japanese government and draw attention to the issue (①, and parts of ④). Also, the British recognize that these were extraordinary circumstances with 15,000 Japanese troops being mobilized, and the British also saw the connection with a change in position regarding its China policy based on how the articles of the Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty would impact an armed conflict between Japan and China. For reference, other research has shown that during this period after World War I, skepticism about Japan's contributions to the Anglo-Japanese alliance began to emerge in Great Britain (Kadota 2015).

Third, the decisive fuse that lit the fire of anti-Japan sentiment was the "statement of Colonel Mizumachi." The severity of the "problematic statement of Mizumachi" can be gleaned from daily reports about it in the *Yomiuri Newspaper*,¹⁶ but the fact that at least two editorials were also written about this confirms its significant impact.¹⁷ To garner an understanding of this incident, the following documents are analyzed: Document 8 provides the "Mizumachi statement," Document 9 is a critical examination in the *Yomiuri Newspaper* of the differences in the points of view of the Army and the Foreign Ministry about the statement, and Document 10 provides a general review of the response measures.

Document 8

Colonel Mizumachi, chairman of an Army committee recently dispatched to Hunchun, on [November] 30th sent a statement to Canadian Presbyterian missionaries residing in Jiandao about the objectives of the Japanese Army's deployment to Hunchun and other areas of Jiandao, imploring them to engage in self-reflection. (International Hunchun, Sent November 30)

"The Japanese suppression of Koreans in Jiandao is an unavoidable affair, similar to US actions against Mexico or British actions against Afghanistan. These types of affairs can easily be found elsewhere. Reports about the results of the Japanese operations including the burning of homes and the killing of crowds of Koreans are true. However, if you look at the nature of these sorts of military actions, these are not strange things. It was inevitable and most of the burning of buildings was carried out after securing undeniable evidence. The same measures were taken during the execution of Koreans, and those who committed serious crimes were shot dead on the spot. Among those who were executed may have been people who were innocent. If this is the case then it is very regrettable, with most of the 200,000 Koreans residing in Jiandao displaying hostility there is no way to distinguish enemy and civilian. Rather, attempts to stigmatize the Japanese military as having committed atrocities is nothing more than malicious propaganda against Japan. I have no doubt that you gentlemen would never go to another country and arouse

16. "Sendō keikoku" (1920); "Nihongun o chūshō" (1920); "Mizumachi taisa no seimei" (1920); "Seimei kanchisezu" (1920); "Senkyōshi kanwa" (1920); "Mizumachi taisa seimei" (1920); "Eikoku gikai de" (1920); "Mizumachi chijutsu torikesaru" (1920); "Kantō mondai" (1920).

17. "Gunjin gaikō konzetsu" (1920); "Gunjin no hii kyōkyū" (1920).

political unrest. I understand that you would never dream as religious folk of causing harm to the friendly relations between your country and Japan by providing spiritual and material support directly or indirectly to the Koreans, but regretfully it is impossible to hide the fact that most Japanese people feel the opposite as I do, and I do not want to rethink your intentions. *In every country, every self-governing dominion, there are a number of ethnic groups and many conspiracies are being planned. For example, secessionist attitudes in India are a big challenge for governance in India. Therefore, if you gentlemen have in some fashion openly or secretly assisted leaders of the Korean independence or anti-Japan sentiment groups, you will have found justification for Japanese Buddhists to support India's separation and anti-Great Britain movement.* Therefore, if you gentlemen should avoid mentioning political issues at all and focus only on religious work, the government and people of Japan and I will express our profound gratitude to you and even assist with development of your missionary work. If your actions should show the opposite tendency, then it will be difficult for your work to proceed. In other words, the growth or destruction of your missionary work inside and outside of Korea is tied only to whether or not you cooperate with the Japanese government." ("Sendō keikoku" 1920, emphasis added by the author)

The above "Mizumachi statement" includes expressions that caused diplomatic tensions, but at the same time some core ideas that represent Mizumachi's views. Using British colonial rule of India as an example and warning that the missionaries' involvement behind the scenes in Jiandao would be like Japanese Buddhists' involvement in the anti-British movement in India provoked a very emotional opposition, particularly from the British Foreign Ministry and the headquarters of the missionary groups.¹⁸

Document 9 contains parts of a *Yomiuri Newspaper* article which introduces the impact and hidden side of the conflict between the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Army in the wake of the "Mizumachi statement."

18. "On the 8th, British Ambassador Elliot called on Foreign Minister Uchida and said that the statement by Colonel Mizumachi is being interpreted as unreasonable for causing anxiety over British rule in India. He complained that the real intention behind this statement was the exercise of Japanese military power in Jiandao. The main reason for the British ambassador's *démarche* is that Mizumachi, in his statement, used the actions of Captain Dyer in Amritsar, India as an example, that the massacres being carried out in Jiandao have parallels with actual cases in India. The point where Mizumachi asks about what impact could come about if Buddhists caused unrest in India in the same way that Christian missionaries in Jiandao have incited reckless behavior among Koreans has come into question and has seemingly caused great concern in Great Britain. According to the statement of one official, the British ambassador seems to incorrectly assume that the Japanese government is hoping to cause unrest in India as a retaliatory measure, and that the mood at the moment is extremely serious." ("Seimei kanchisezu" 1920)

Document 9

As the problematic statement of Colonel Mizumachi was made without any [prior] consent of the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry is not attaching great importance to it, but we suddenly received a *démarche* from the British ambassador and Foreign Minister Uchida has been suddenly embarrassed. As a response, we recognize it is suitable to relieve the doubts of the British ambassador by stating that “*this statement was absolutely not given in the name of the Empire of Japan*, and the imperial government has no intention of acting in a manner that would concern the British government.” To this end, we have drafted a retraction statement on the 10th and negotiated with the Army to receive Minister of the Army Tanaka’s approval.

However, the Army has expressed the position that *even if there is a démarche from the British ambassador, there would be no end to the Foreign Ministry providing written explanations in each case a convenient measure taken by the local military officials causes some foreign misunderstanding*. Especially if we read Colonel Mizumachi’s statement carefully, *there is no need to issue a retraction* because there is nothing that should concern the British ambassador. Rather, the Army has taken the position that *the Foreign Ministry’s retraction would make this issue bigger than it already is*, and has asked the Foreign Ministry to find another means for seeking understanding from the British ambassador. Therefore, the statement already prepared by the Foreign Ministry has not been acted upon. However, on the evening of the 10th, Minister Uchida met Minister Tanaka by chance at an informal gathering at the Legation of the Netherlands and described in detail the considerably difficult position he is in with the British ambassador and again sought approval for the above-mentioned statement. Minister of the Army Tanaka expressed sympathy for Minister Uchida’s predicament but did not approve of the written statement and instead only stated he would reconsider the issue. The following day on the 11th, Minister of the Army Tanaka sent Lieutenant Colonel Hata to visit Foreign Minister Uchida to give the Minister of the Army’s second reply to the proposed statement, and, according to a definitive source, *Minister of the Army Tanaka had still not expressed his approval of the statement* by the evening of the 11th, and *it will likely be difficult to find common ground*. It is assumed that the Minister of Foreign Affairs will have to express the position of the imperial government to the British Ambassador and find another means of securing his understanding. (“Mizumachi taisa no seimei” 1920, bolded emphasis in original, italicized emphasis added by the author)

The above document from the *Yomiuri Newspaper*, perhaps better than any record from the Foreign Ministry or the Ministry of the Army, vividly captures the embarrassment and conflict of opinions between the authorities in each ministry.

The first important point in the above document is that, as described in the first emphasized portion, the Foreign Ministry at first did not think the Mizumachi statement was important but then became embarrassed by it. Second, there is a frank description of the conflict between the two ministries as the Foreign

Ministry sought prior approval from the Ministry of the Army to release a statement saying the Mizumachi statement did not at all reflect the official opinion of the Japanese imperial government as part of the effort to relieve the tension and seek the British ambassador's understanding. In particular, the Ministry of the Army was concerned that if a written explanation was provided every time a foreign country misunderstood some Japanese action then the situation would grow into a larger issue, and Minister Tanaka's consistent and firm position against the "release of a written statement" stands out. In the end, the Foreign Ministry simply stated that "this was the private opinion of Mizumachi and the government was not involved nor had anything to do with it" ("Seimei kanchisezu" 1920). However, the trouble caused by the Mizumachi statement did not end here.

Document 10

Colonel Mizumachi, who was dispatched by the Ministry of the Army to Jiandao, sent a statement to foreign missionaries and has caused criticism among Chinese and British people. It is regretful that the issue has recently developed into a diplomatic issue. To provide more details on the issue, as a result of an Army officer overstepping his authority by making remarks about foreign relations, an international incident has grown large and is being repeated over and over. Moreover, ① *it is important to recognize that the failure of the Army to take any actions to improve the situation or reflect on its actions is no longer one that can be overlooked as an incident between the Ministry of the Army and Foreign Ministry.* The responsibility for international problems is not simply that of the Foreign Ministry nor the Ministry of the Army but of all Japanese people. *In the case of Colonel Mizumachi's gaffe, the discussions about the issue between the Ministry of the Army and the Foreign Ministry has ended, but we cannot say that the issue has been laid to rest. When these types of problems arise, it is always the people who suffer. . .*

Colonel Mizumachi's statement was incorrect from start to finish. Among the comments in the statement, even if the remarks about the British commander in India, General Dyer, are true,¹⁹ calling this a precedent and ② *committing the*

19. The statement sent by Mizumachi to the foreign missionaries can be found in detail in Appendix 17 of the *History of the Jiandao Expedition*. Here I will only reproduce the portion of the statement that became an issue: "The executions conducted by our forces were inevitable and were carried out after a brief hearing during which testimony from the local residents was heard and definitive evidence was produced. It is difficult to deny the fact that some civilians were mistakenly killed, but this was never the intention of the Japanese Army. Furthermore, the suppression of armed Korean rebels is not the same as the slaughter of many innocents by General (Reginald Edward Harry) Dyer in Amritsar, India last year. The official announcement (*kokuji*) on October 16, instructions given to enlisted soldiers, and the official announcement made by the Commander of the 19th Division show that we took every precaution. Some are saying that the execution of unruly crowds by our forces after a simple hearing is a crime against humanity. These kinds of remarks do not seriously consider the rebellious circumstances and the damage inflicted on

mass murder of innocent civilians is a horrible crime that is clearly wrong to anybody at any time in any place. In addition, although it may be common within the Japanese Army to look at other countries and justify “necessary cases” of burning buildings used for religious education and killing innocent people, this was an improper statement that should be unquestionably condemned by people everywhere. It is quite understandable that this episode has been covered by English newspapers in China and that the British ambassador submitted a démarche over it.

No, it should not stop at another country’s démarche. The Japanese people should without hesitation devise a plan to eradicate these kinds of gaffes by the military. To do this, ③ *if the Foreign Ministry, which is the institution entrusted by the state and its people to manage diplomatic issues, has the capacity and [proper] thinking skills to put forward remedies for the military’s diplomatic failure then this is suitable. However, if the cause of the military participating in diplomacy is the impotence and incompetence of the Foreign Ministry, condoning the military’s overpowering participation in diplomacy should be considered a problem of the people and thus taken up by the legislature with the persons responsible being strictly punished so that military diplomacy can be uprooted.* (“Gunjin gaikō konzetsu” 1920, emphasis added by the author)

The problems with the “Mizumachi gaffe” according to the above editorial are twofold. First, as pointed out in parts ① and ③, this diplomatic issue grew and is now causing harm to the Japanese citizenry. It recognizes the problem of tolerating incompetent soldiers’ participation in diplomacy as a national issue, and emphasizes the need for strict disciplinary measures and a plan to eradicate the problem. We can note a strong wariness about soldiers repeatedly overstepping their authority and the author sees the citizenry as those hurt by the country’s tarnished image abroad. Second, as seen in part ②, it is stated clearly that “committing mass murder against innocent civilians is a horrible crime,” and this statement which defends such actions “should be unquestionably condemned by people everywhere.” However, despite this clear recognition of the inhumane actions of the army, the following report avoided mentioning the infamous massacre during the Jiandao Expedition in Zhangyan Village.

Document 11

There are continuous reports that the Japanese forces in Jiandao occasionally commit massacres, but these are gross misrepresentations. Even if these are likely fabricated propaganda developed by Koreans or others with anti-Japan sentiment, there is the potential that these reports can cause concern. Therefore, we would like to provide two or three facts for reference. (Army statement)

Japanese people nor understand the circumstances of the trials held by our forces. I cannot help but say to these people, based on my own superficial observation, that they are slandering Japan in the name of humanity for their own benefit.” (Chosŏngun Saryŏngbu 2019, 346)

1. The Protestant and private schools burned down on October 30 in the area around the town of Yongjŏngchŏn were the base of operations for a Korean plot, and were burned down after many independence newspapers and Korean documents were discovered.
2. The Protestant school and church burned down in Namp'yŏng-dong, which was located across the river from Musan not only contained numerous documents of a seditious nature but was also the base for a Korean conspiracy.
3. *The Koreans killed on October 30 in Zhangyan-dong (Yilangou in Yanji County) were cremated, and a foreign missionary took pictures of it perhaps to use as propaganda.* Given this situation, there is nothing wrong with the actions of our military, and there are many locals who greatly appreciate the suppression operations of our military. They have pleaded with us to permanently station our troops in the region. *The above-mentioned rumors are nothing more than groundless false reports.* (“Nihongun o chūshō” 1920, emphasis added by the author)

Despite the clear testimony of foreign missionaries in the region who witnessed the brutal massacres, the shootings in Zhangyan-dong were referred to as nothing more than fabrications, defamation, and false reports.²⁰ We can see that in fact these reports are only interested in vociferously criticizing Colonel Mizumachi's statement as a good example of the military overstepping its authority by engaging in diplomacy and calls for an end to such practices. But when it comes to the inhumane massacres of civilians, the newspaper avoids confirming the truth of these incidents. In this way, the *Yomiuri Newspaper* was limited in the awareness it provided its readers.

Conclusion

This article has reviewed the perceptions of Japanese society about the Japanese Army's Jiandao Expedition, which began in October 1920 and ended in May 1921, through the *Yomiuri Newspaper*. What new perspectives has this study offered compared with previous research that utilized the reports and documents of the Japanese Army and Foreign Ministry?

First, the image of the Jiandao Expedition painted by Ministry of the Army documents and reports is one of a joint operation by Japan and China based on a smoothly concluded agreement. However, the *Yomiuri Newspaper* shows that the government in Beijing strongly opposed the Japanese plan, and the Japanese government in the end was only able to receive a “temporary understanding” from China. In other words, this was a “joint invasion” only in name, and was in

20. See Kim Yeonok (2020a).

fact a “unilateral invasion.”

Second, on November 2, two weeks after receiving understanding for its “deployment of troops,” the Japanese government had to consent to Chinese demands for “withdrawal.” However, the position of the Army, which already had troops in China, and the Foreign Ministry, which was concerned about public order in Jiandao, was to “delay the withdrawal” as long as possible or request the Chinese government give prior approval to a redeployment to use as leverage in negotiations. The Chinese government strongly responded to this position by the Japanese, stating the Japanese were “overstepping their authority” and “violating China’s sovereignty.” These strong complaints by China about Japan “stepping over the line” and facts about the long negotiations were revealed for the first time through this review of the *Yomiuri Newspaper*.

Third, Japan did not respond to China’s *démarches* by quickly withdrawing all its troops, and instead plotted to either delay the withdrawal or substitute troops with police officers in Jiandao. In the midst of this scheming, the “Jiandao deployment” began receiving international attention and anti-Japan sentiment began to rise. Not only did Japan receive “demands from the great powers of Great Britain, France, and the US for an explanation of the deployment of troops to Jiandao,” but in Great Britain in particular the “Jiandao issue” became a subject of discussion in Parliament. Colonel Mizumachi’s “gaffe” about foreign missionaries controlling the independence movement and ideology of Koreans in the region caused an uproar so significant that it was addressed in newspaper editorials. However, criticism of Mizumachi’s statement only superficially focused on the words or criticized the military for overstepping its authority, and avoided stating facts about the inhumane massacre of civilians in Jiandao. Instead, the newspapers characterized the killings in the Zhangyan-dong region as fabrications, defamation, and false reports. This displayed the limits of the perspective offered by the *Yomiuri Newspaper*.

Finally, it is important to note, as shown in parts of the documents cited in the main body of this article, that the great powers of the world began growing concerned at this time in 1920 about Japan mobilizing 15,000 troops and sending them into Chinese territory, due to the possibility of an armed conflict between Japan and China, and the possible long-term implications of Japan’s actions. Similar to the criticisms of the Sino-American News Agency, the approach of Japan to not withdraw and “hold out” as long as possible, or demand from China the right to “freely” or “repeatedly” deploy its troops in the future made it look as if Japan was “using the Hunchun incident as a pretext to secure rights on land surrounding the Chinese Eastern Railway” or had other “ulterior motives.” That is, the Jiandao Expedition in 1920 was the first signal of Japan’s ambition to expand

into the Asian continent, and Japan's effort to lay the ground for "repeated" troop deployments at this time was a preparation for the full invasion of Manchuria in the 1930s. In this regard, reviewing the Jiandao Expedition through the lens of the *Yomiuri Newspaper* is important as it confirms the 1920 Jiandao Expedition was a form of preparation for taking control of Manchuria, something which cannot be understood by only looking at the official documents of the Japanese Army.

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