

**GLOBAL COLD WAR, ASIA, AND POSTWAR JAPAN, 1945~1972**

**Liberation Betrayed: The Cold War and the Korean Minority Question in U.S.-Occupied Japan, 1945-1948** | CHOI Deokhyo

By the end of World War II, Japan had a population of over two million Koreans, the majority of whom were both migrants and wartime conscripted workers. When the U.S. (Allied) forces occupied Japan after the war, General Douglas MacArthur and the Japanese government tried to send as many Koreans back to Korea as possible in order to reduce the surplus population in war-torn, demobilized Japan. While nearly three-fourths of the Korean colonial migrants soon returned to their country, which had just been liberated from Japanese rule, over half a million Koreans remained in postwar Japan, forming its largest ethnic minority. As these Korean colonial migrants emerged as new political subjects invigorated by Japan's defeat and the end of colonial rule in Korea, their presence became a "problem" in postwar Japan. How did the U.S. Occupation and the Japanese state respond to this "Korean minority question"?

This paper examines how the practice of liberation by Koreans in Japan developed into a flashpoint for U.S. Cold War interventionism. The so-called "Korean-school disputes" in early 1948, in which the U.S. Occupation and Japanese authorities worked together to crack down hard on Korean demonstrations protesting the forcible closure of Korean ethnic schools and demanding non-interference in their self-determination, epitomized a crucial convergence between Japan's "postcolonial" problem and the U.S. global Cold War agenda. U.S. and Japanese policy makers labeled the Korean demonstrations as "red riots" and linked them to the "Soviet-backed communist offensive" in southern Korea. This paper analyzes the U.S. Occupation policy toward Koreans in Japan by placing it within the broader context of both the beginning of the global Cold War and the rise of the international human rights regime.

• **Keywords:** Cold War, international human rights regime, national minorities question, U.S. Occupation, Korean minority in Japan

**San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Non-Signatories of Northeast Asia:  
Preservation of the Norms and the Soviet Union, South Korea, and China** |  
KIM Soongbae

This paper focuses on the explicit provisions prescribed in the San Francisco Peace Treaty that officially ended the Asia-Pacific War started by Japan, and the standards derived from those provisions. The standards accompanying the San Francisco Peace Treaty included restoration

of peace with the end of the war, accompaniment of the Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, reorganization of territory, compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the trend of the Cold War. Based on this setting, this paper makes a macroscopic investigation on the relationship with the Northeast Asian non-signatories, such as the Soviet Union, South Korea, and China, to review their relationship with the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Japan, which restored its sovereignty with the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, restored or normalized diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1956, South Korea in 1965, and China in 1972. These non-signatories of the San Francisco Peace Treaty already maintained historical and political relations with Japan before 1945; therefore, it was necessary to make diplomatic ties to reestablish their relationship with the reborn Japan. Though they did not sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, they improved relations with Japan in the form of accepting the standards of the peace treaty through normalization of diplomatic relations. In conclusion, it is a historical fact that the San Francisco Peace Treaty that ended the war up until 1945 was born during the Cold War and that it solidified the Cold War order in Northeast Asia. However, restoration and normalization of diplomatic relations between non-signatories of the peace treaty and Japan did not deviate from the standards created through the San Francisco Peace Treaty. From this perspective, the start of post-war Japan had no choice but to engage in limited diplomacy during the Cold War, the age of ideology. Yet, through diplomatic relations with the non-signatories, Japan was able to safeguard the standards of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and expand its sphere of political action. This result also led the non-signers to preserve the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

• **Keywords:** San Francisco Peace Treaty, Cold War, Restoration of the Soviet Union-Japan, Normalization of South Korea-Japan, Normalization of China-Japan

## **The Special Procurement of Japan in the 1950s and the Cold War | CHUNG**

Jin Sung

The special procurement that emerged in the wake of the outbreak of the Korean War was one of the factors defining the Japanese economy through the 1950s. The special procurement facilitated the growth of the Japanese economy by enabling the acquisition of large amounts of foreign currency worth \$800 million a year during the Korean War. To ensure continued economic growth, the Japanese government sought to secure a new special procurement to replace the Korean War special procurement after the Korean War armistice. As a result, by utilizing the offshore procurement of U.S. foreign aid, Japan was able to acquire special procurement amounting to \$400 million or \$500 million a year in the late 1950s. In addition to acquiring foreign currency, the special procurement also served as an opportunity to revive Japan's military industry and spearhead Japan's economic advancement in Southeast Asia.

Japan's economic gains from the special procurement were derived from Japan's deep involvement in the Cold War structure in East Asia, led by the United States. During the Korean War, Japan earned a large amount of special income by faithfully implementing the role of the war's rear supply base. In order to secure new special procurement after the end of

the Korean War, the Japanese government and the business community responded actively to the U.S. government's initiative to mobilize Japan's industrial productivity for the procurement of U.S. military forces, and actively participated in the U.S. foreign aid strategy after the enforcement of the Treaty of San Francisco. Japan has secured special economic benefits by actively committing to the U.S. strategy for East Asia. The United States fostered Japan's economic power as a rear base under the Cold War structure by providing the economic benefits of special procurement. The special procurement was at a point where the interests of Japan and the United States coincided. On the other hand, the special procurement was located at a point where the interests of Korea and Japan diverged. Not only was the Korean-War-special-procurement itself attributable to Korea's astronomical material and human losses of the Korean War, but also Japan's special procurement for Korean reconstruction meant Korean economy's another subordination to the Japanese economy.

• **Keywords:** the Cold War, special procurement, the economic cooperation between Japan and U.S., MSA, the Korean War

### **The Cold War of Japan-DPRK Relations, 1950~1973: Division Structure of Korea on Postwar Process of Japan | PARK Jung Jin**

Japan-DPRK normalization is discussed as an alternative to overcoming the "1965 regime" between ROK and Japan. To verify this suggestion, this paper reviews the Japan-DPRK relations in light of the postwar process of Japan. The analysis covers two periods. First, the process of the formation of the "1965 regime" between ROK and Japan is reviewed, focusing on North Korean factors. Second, the detente between North Korea and Japan in the 1970s is analyzed based on the impact of the "1965 regime." The main focus is how the Cold War's influence on Japan-DPRK relations was realized through the division structure of Korea. The purpose of this paper is to find the answer to this question: how did the inter-Korean competition over the sole political legitimacy on the Korean Peninsula affect the postwar process of Japan? The causality between inter-Korean relations and Japan-DPRK relations is also examined.

The formation of the "1965 regime" was the result of not only ROK-Japan relations but also Japan-DPRK relations. Therefore, the transformation of the "1965 regime" should be redefined from the perspective of "Korean Peninsula-Japan relations." Will Japan-DPRK normalization end the controversy over Article II of the 1965 Treaty? The tentative conclusion made in Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration (2002) was "economic cooperation." When it comes to Japan-DPRK normalization, Article III of the 1965 Treaty will have to be revised between ROK and Japan. This means that the political legitimacy of ROK as the only lawful government on the Korean Peninsula will be denied. Japan-DPRK normalization is essential for peaceful co-existence of the "Two Koreas"; however, this also means the institutionalization of the division of Korea.

• **Keywords:** Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, Japan-DPRK relations, the "1965 regime", the postwar process of Japan, North and South Korea competition for legitimacy

### **The Co-produced Truth: U.S. Occupation, Japanese Leftist Tell-All Media, and the Rewriting of History in the Aftermath of the Asia-Pacific War | JUNG Ji Hee**

In the aftermath of the Asia-Pacific War, U.S. occupation forces attempted to re-educate the Japanese through various media outlets into favoring a specific view of the war that portrayed them as helpless victims simply misled by their deceitful military oligarchy. Such a portrayal had been deliberately orchestrated as part of the U.S. endeavor to sway the Japanese people over to the American system in the prospect of a future conflict with the Soviet Union. Yet, unlike the post-postwar Japanese revisionists' claim, the U.S. occupation forces were not solely responsible for the rewriting predicated on the strategy of exposing the historical truth allegedly concealed from the people by Japan's wartime leaders. This paper sheds light on the Japanese media's appropriation of the Asia-Pacific War and the audience's involvement in their rewriting of history by investigating the popular leftist tell-all magazine, *Truth* (*Shinsō*). Published by the People's Publisher (Jinminsha) led by communist-oriented former ideological converts (*tenkōsha*), *Truth's* ultimate tell-all goal differed from that of the U.S. occupation forces; nevertheless, in reducing the search for the historical truth to revealing supposedly concealed absolute historical facts, both made it easier for the Japanese to adopt a new view of history. In this process, the belief in objective historical facts represented the change in historical view as natural and even inevitable. Considering the postwar rewriting of history as a complex process of negotiations, in which not only the American military personnel but also the Japanese media and audience actively participated, this article intends to reconsider the presumed dichotomy between the U.S. occupation forces and Japanese people, and to contribute to recent scholarly efforts to understand the Global Cold War not as a unilateral framework, but as a sort of patchwork created through interactions between diverse groups and individuals.

• **Keywords:** Cold War, postwar historiography, historical facts, historical revisionism, U.S. occupation of Japan, tell-all media

### **The Post-War Pacifism of Ashihei Hino and the Imaginative Geographies of the Cold War: A Study on the "Anti-nuclear Pacifism" Discourse | KIM Jiyoung**

This paper aims to study how the dynamics of decolonization and the Cold War intersected in Asia after 1945 and investigates its correlation with the pacifist discourse in post-war Japan. It examines how the "pacifist" messages delivered by Ashihei Hino in the cultural diplomacy of the 1950s were accepted as a universal form of pacifism, in the context of Japan's relations with Asia, the Soviet Union, and the United States during the Cold War, focusing on the cases of the Conference for Asian Countries, Ilya Ehrenburg's visit to Japan, and Hino's visit to the U.S., respectively.

The Japanese delegation that participated in the Conference for Asian Countries held in New Delhi, India, in 1955 was welcomed as a member of Asia to seek pacifist diplomacy amid the splitting of the world into polarizing camps such as the free world versus the Communist bloc and the West (former empires) versus Asia (former colonies). Meanwhile,

with the escalation of the nuclear arms race between the Soviet Union and the U.S. in the 1950s, a cultural Cold War was actively deployed against Japan, “the only country ravaged by the atomic bombs,” by the two superpowers. Amidst this, Ehrenburg, the renowned Russian author, visited Japan as the first cultural envoy after bilateral diplomatic relations were restored following the Soviet-Japan Joint Declaration. Hino accompanied Ehrenburg to Nagasaki in April 1957; in 1958, he also visited the U.S. on invitation from the Department of State. Voicing harsh criticism against the Cold War violence, Hino constructed an image of postwar Japan representing “universal pacifism.” However, in light of the fact that the Japanese empire’s past was whitewashed in the process of Hino’s efforts for cultural diplomacy and that his pacifist discourse would have been impossible without the Cold War politics, Hino’s pacifism appears as a Cold War narrative that edited out Japan’s imperial misadventures.

• **Keywords:** Ashihei Hino, the Cold War, Pacifism, The Conference for Asian Countries, Ilya Ehrenburg

### **The Cold War in Japanese Cinemas: From <The Last War> to <Moscow mon amour> | KANG Tae Woong**

The situation of Japan during the Cold War differed from those of other East Asian countries that were in the front line of the democratic and communist camps. Japan restored the diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in the 1950s, and the Communist Party also has acted legitimately. However, it does not mean that certain cultures reflecting the Cold War were not created in Japan. This paper aims to offer a new perspective on Japan’s Cold War culture by reanalyzing movies that were not covered in the context of the Cold War in previous researches. I first looked into how the relationship between Japan and the U.S. within the democratic camp was reflected in the Japanese movies. The nuclear bomb attack, a sensitive issue between the two countries, was dealt with in the film, but the main subjects, Japan’s war responsibility and the subjectivity of dropping the bomb by the U.S., were deflected. In the early 1960s when the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world perilously close to nuclear war, <The Last War> was completed as a work of contradictory narratives. Although the film was set in the Cold War, it could not depict the traits of the Cold War because of the special circumstances which Japan faced. Furthermore, it could be observed that the victimhood nationalism to accept the nuclear bomb damage initially had affected the film. The relationship between the communist camp and Japan was able to be found in a joint film between Japan and the Soviet Union. In the movie, there was no fear of ideological confrontation or nuclear war. The Soviet Union was superior in terms of culture, and Japan was represented as boys and women to dispel its established image as an aggressor. These characteristics, revealed from Soviet-Japanese relations, were also found in common with movies made within relations with the United States.

• **Keywords:** The Cold War, the Bell of Nagasaki, Don’t Forget the Song of Nagasaki, The Last War, Moscow mon amour, joint movie, victimhood nationalism

## ARTICLES

### Women's Suffrage Movement in Modern Japan and Party Politics, 1924~1932: Fusae Ichikawa, Movement Strategy of 'Women's Suffrage Acquisition Alliance' and Its Changes | LEE Eun-Gyong

This article studies the history of so-called "*fusen* (婦選) movement," or women's suffrage movement, which is the most representative example of women's movement in modern Japan. Specifically, it focuses on Fusae Ichikawa and "Women's Suffrage Acquisition Alliance (婦選獲得同盟, *fusen kakutoku dōmei*)." Unlike previous studies on *fusen* movement which mainly were motivated to find the origin of "war cooperation," this article has two unique characteristics. One is that the article attempts to understand the trend of *fusen* movement through the changes in Japanese political regime at the time, which is the counterpart of the movement itself, as well as the changes that followed in the strategies of *fusen* movement. The other is that the article emphasizes the impact of examples from the U.K. and the U.S., where women's suffrage was already acquired through cooperating in World War I, on the formation of *fusen* movement strategies.

Modern Japan's *fusen* movement took place under special circumstances. First, Fusae Ichikawa and others knew that many Western countries including the U.K. and the U.S. gave suffrage to women as a reward for cooperating with the government during national crises like the total war. This knowledge that enabled them to practically "foresee" (予知) the result of *fusen* movement influenced its strategies. Second, *fusen* movement's counterparts were political parties called Seiyū-kai and Minsei-tō and their cabinets; however, the lifespan of a regime was short, promises were hardly kept, and the existence of party politics could not be guaranteed. Third, Japan at the time was actively introducing the reasonable lifestyle of the West, so the central and local government's suggestion related to "life" was difficult for women to reject, and it often was the linkage that connected the two sides without much opposition.

In this setting, *fusen* movement chose the following strategies when it initially began against the party cabinets. First, based on the example from the West, it adhered to peaceful methods with the certainty of success. Second, it embarked on activities for the Diet, or the legislative activities (and election support) based on party neutralism. Third, it had a tendency of emphasizing the benefits that the realization of women's suffrage would bring rather than its legitimacy like gender equality as the argument for women's suffrage. Fourth, also as a result of learning from the past, it focused on not only the acquisition of women's suffrage, but also women's politics education that had the future in mind. Fifth, it expanded its sphere of activity to life and social problems, which were socially important issues, in order to gain more support from the public. Sixth, it aimed for the unity of women for women's suffrage, or women's suffrage for the unity of women.

However, the strategies above were basically for the period from the formation of the alliance in 1924 to the collapse of party cabinets and the end of party politics in 1932 due to the May 15 Incident. Since then, as military officials instead of party politicians became prime ministers and formed cabinets and even the Diet dominated by Seiyū-kai and Minsei-

tō received pressure from fascism and the military, the alliance could not maintain its initial guidelines. In other words, after the fall of party politics, when domestic politics reformed into the total war or the Imperial Aid (大政翼賛, *taisei-yokusan*) regime as the military and fascism especially rose to power and the Asia Pacific War took off, *fusen* movement's strategy also had to be revised. As a result of altering the method of *fusen* movement against the changed counterpart, it was accused of "war cooperation," which will be reviewed in detail separately.

- **Keywords:** Women's Suffrage Acquisition Alliance (*fusen kakutoku dōmei*), Fusae Ichikawa, women's suffrage movement, party cabinet, Seiyū-kai, Minsei-tō, Manchurian Incident, May 15 Incident

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## **PERSPECTIVE**

### **A Thought on the Formation and Operation of the East Asian Consortium of Japanese Studies (EACJS) | PARK Cheol Hee**

This article aims to record the initial process of forming and operating the East Asian Consortium of Japanese Studies (EACJS), which was first formed in 2016. The idea of initiating the EACJS began emerging in 2013, when the author participated in the East Asia Japan Studies Forum (EAJSF). A primitive proposal to form the EACJS was made at the EAJSF held in Awajishima in 2014 and was developed into a concrete suggestion at a seminar organized by Atsumi Foundation in 2015. The idea of holding the first EACJS academic conference was endorsed at the EAJSF in Tianjin in March 2016. The first international academic conference was actually held in Songdo, Korea, from November 30 to December 2, 2016. After this first meeting, the EACJS international academic conferences have been held annually, including its fourth meeting in Taipei, Taiwan, in 2019.

The EACJS is based on three philosophical foundations: first, promoting "transnational linkage" in Japanese studies that goes beyond a national border; second, "interdisciplinary integration of Japanese studies" that goes beyond a boundary of a single discipline; third, "opening future frontier" of Japanese studies by including next generation researchers on Japan.

A few innovations in organizing the EACJS facilitated successful formation of the meeting: first, "rotating the venue of the conference," which prevented the monopoly of organizational benefits to a single institution; second, "burden sharing formula," which reduced the burden of fundraising; third, "open door policy," which encouraged barrier-free participation of Japan-related researchers.

Still, the formation and operation of the EACJS would have been impossible without active initiatives of five initial founders, sincere cooperation of Japan studies organizations in East Asia, and enormous support from the Japan Foundation.

- **Keywords:** East Asia Japan Studies Forum (EAJSF), East Asian Consortium of Japanese Studies (EACJS), Network, Atsumi Foundation, Institute for Japanese Studies at Seoul National University, Japan Foundation